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EFFECTIVE 
REGULATORY REFORM 
HINGES ON MOTIVATING THE 
"STREET LEVEL" BUREAUCRAT* 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.t 
T his issue commemorates the passage, forty years ago, of the Ad-ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 1 For forty years this act has 
ruled the administrative process; it has been little modified, except as 
to the disclosure of government information.2 This fact not only 
demonstrates the resilience of this legislative effort but the failures of 
subsequent reform efforts. Thus the APA stands as the most success-
ful, if not the only successful, regulatory reform. 
Although we may ask why the AP A has been so successful, the more 
important question for modern administrative law is why have other 
administrative reforms been so unsuccessful?3 Thus, while remember-
ing the past, administrative law must look to the challenge of the 
future. 
I assert here that substantial improvement in the performance of the 
administrative process must look beyond structure and procedure. 
The APA provides an adequate general structure for administrative 
decisionmaking and hence the subsequent procedural and structural 
improvements have been confined to refinements and innovations 
from that provided by the APA. Substantial improvement in the per-
formance of the administrative process must explore new avenues. For 
*Copyright © 1986 Charles H. Koch, Jr. 
tWoodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law; B.A., 
1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, George Washington University; LL.M., 1975, 
University of Chicago. 
'5 u.s.c. §§ 551-706. 
2Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); Privacy Act, of 1974,5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (1982); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982). 
'"For, to be blunt, the history of American administrative law is a history of failed 
ideas." j. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC jUSTICE I (1983). 
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one thing, the next generation of reform efforts should explore 
methods aimed at motivating administrative decisionmakers, espe-
cially those at the implementing or "street level," to further such goals 
as fairness, correctness, dignity, and satisfaction.• 
CRISIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Today administrative law faces a crisis-the failures of the adminis-
trative process in important areas of government have been translated 
into increased rejection of government efforts to humanize modern 
society.5 The present state of the law moves many modern thought 
leaders to advocate abandonment of the administrative process as a 
tool for solving societal problems. 
Those of us who still believe in the use of government to civilize and 
rationalize our complex society have been involved in a debate, similar 
to that preceding the APA, over the value of the administrative pro-
cess. Because the administrative process merely orders those activities 
whereby government is involved in solving problems, it is merely the 
tool of a positive state. Thus the debate over the reform of the adminis-
trative process, as McGarity explores earlier in this issue, ultimately 
represents a debate over the acceptable extent of positive government. 6 
In the pre-APA era, hope for a positive state brought about a 
commitment to government solutions and thereby the rise of the 
administrative process. Landis, one of the strongest advocates of the 
4These values have been expressed in several different ways. I have listed them as 
fairness to the individual (including individual dignity and satisfaction), responsiveness, 
and efficiency. C. KocH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE,§ l.1I, at 24-28 (1985). 
Verkuil has listed fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction. Verkuil, A Study of Informal 
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976). Mashaw lists fairness, dignity, 
equality, and tradition. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 28 (1976). 
5Mashaw has expressed the dilemma for most of us in administrative law: 
In part the disposition to construct such a vision is a pragmatic response to my personal 
inability to move firmly into the camp of the cynics. But even if the effort is in some 
sense a working out of individual psychic need, the exploration seems to have a 
broader utility. That society has collective needs, at least collective wants, seems 
inescapable. And, since we lack the altruistic genetic programming of the social insect, 
these needs and wants can be satisfied only through a bureaucratized application of 
collective authority. We need somehow to come to terms with our constant demand for 
institutions-bureaucracies-that once created we then excoriate. 
J. MASHAW, supra note~~. at I4-15. 
6McGarity, Regulatory Reform and the Positive State: An Historical Overview, 38 AD. L. REv. · 
399 (1986). 
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administrative process, wrote in 1938 that the allocation of numerous 
societal decisions to the administrative process was the result of a 
natural evolution: 
Two tendencies in the expanding civilization of the late nineteenth century 
seem to me to foreshadow the need for methods of government different in 
kind from those that had prevailed in the past. These are the rise of 
industrialism and the rise of democracy .... And as the demands for positive 
solution increased and, in the form of legislative measures, were precipi-
tated upon the cathodes of governmental activity, laissez faire-the simple 
belief that only good could come by giving economic forces free play--came 
to an end.7 
When the APA was created there was hope that government had 
'acquired a new tool to combat the adverse effects of a more complex 
society and the enactment of the AP A represented a conceptual victory 
for government involvement in maintaining a modern society. What 
Landis and others saw as a tool for civilizing modern society, however, 
is now seen as a cursed artifact of a discredited regime. 
A new attack on the administrative process has emerged from a 
reinvestigation of some of the same social theories as those which 
supported opposition to the administrative process prior to the enact-
ment of the APA. What is called deregulation today is grounded in 
social policy thinking that varies little from that supporting the "liberty 
of contract" doctrines that held sway just prior to the expansion ad-
ministrative process.8 Yet the tone of the debate is different. It is less 
theoretical and more focused on eff1cient and effective social decision-
making. 
Modern, liberal society, however, is based on a delicate balance 
between government intrusion and freedom of conduct.9 As Landis 
observed almost 50 years ago, this balance is compelled by the recon-
ciliation of technology and democracy. As with any balance, time 
requires adjustments towards new equilibrium. Perhaps we have over-
balanced towards government involvement or perhaps old weightings 
in the direction of certain specific government programs are no longer 
correct. To the extent that deregulation represents an adjustment and 
7j. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7-8 (1938). 
8F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 75-76 (1964) (epilogue by W. Marshall); see 
H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES, 297-98 (1960). 
9
"The essence ofliberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational 
dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for 
the preservation of the community." B. RuSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, 
xxiii (1945). 
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modernization of our mixed economy, it is no doubt beneficial. But 
care requires that we not overcompensate as we shift the weight away 
from government. 
That social decisions by administrative processes can be superior to 
alternatives is admitted in the seminal piece in the modern deregula-
tion debate, Coase's The Problems of Social Cost. 10 There Coase said: 
The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) 
since it is able to inA uence the use of factors of production by administrative 
decision .... 
It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to get 
some things done at a lower cost than could a private organization .... From 
these considerations it follows that direct governmental regulation will not 
necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the 
market or the firm. But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement 
in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when ... a large 
number ·of people are involved and in which therefore the cost of handling 
the problem through the market or the firm may be high. 11 
Therefore, in the modern conflict between the laissez faire approach 
to societal problems and the efficacy of government institutions, more 
so than in the same conflict of the thirties, the issue is comparative cost, 
including error costs, between government decisionmaking and al-
ternatives. Th<:; lesson of recent events for administrative law is clear: if 
the people find your product not worth the cost then they will inevit-
ably go elsewhere. 1:! 
10Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960). 
11/d. at 17-18. 
12Prior to the enactment of the APA, the debate was among lawyers as to whether the 
traditional legal processes, the courts, should have decisionmaking responsibility in 
government programs or whether we should continue to rely on specialized processes 
included under the umbrella of the administrative process. For example, one of the 
strongest advocates for the administrative process, James Landis, wrote in 1938: 
Courts are not unconscious of the fact that, due to their own inadequacies, areas of 
government formerly within their control have been handed over to administrative 
agencies for supervision. The legislative judgments underlying such a partitioning of 
government do not always convince. Thus, under the guise of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation, efforts to thwart the effects of those legislative judgments are 
not uncommon." J. LANDIS, supra note 7, at 123. 
Indeed this entire work is designed to extol the superiority in the proper setting of the 
administrative process over the institutions of government, particularly the courts. 
Today the debate is not over which legal process should supervise a particular societal 
function but whether any legal process should be incorporated at all. The debate today 
involves the choice between the legal processes, including the administrative processes, 
and other alternative forms of decisionmaking outside the legal process. The argument 
is that lawyers and their way of operating do substantial harm. See T. McCRAw, PROPHETS 
o~ REGULATION, 271 (1984). Therefore the deregulation movement which may appear 
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To make a rational choice, however, the "marketplace" of decision-
making techniques must compare the lowest feasible cost governmen-
tal process with the other decisionmaking alternatives. To assure 
against a misallocation here, alternative decisionmaking models must 
be tested against the lowest cost administrative process. If we cannot 
construct an administrative process that will provide the lowest cost 
decision making, including error costs and those in the nature of exter-
nalities, then society should rationally reject the administrative solu-
tion. But administrative law must assure that it has offered society the 
most cost effective administrative alternative. 
The greatest danger is that unnecessary costs, including indirect 
costs, will compel society to move away from regulation of health, 
safety, and welfare.' 3 These areas are particularly important to human-
izing modern society. It is here most of all that administrative law must 
find the best possible processes or betray the hopes of modern govern-
ment. Here, where a large number of people are involved, even Coase 
admits, government decisionmaking may be superior. 14 
For this reason, my criticism of regulatory reform efforts is that they 
are focused too much on structure and procedure as such. Such solu-
tions seem inevitably to raise the cost of the particular administrative 
process without commensurate improv~ment in the delivery of gov-
ernment service. Moreover, these solutions are directed at the opera-
tion of the highest administrative levels but they are much less influen-
tial over the successful operation at the implementation levels of mass 
decisionmaking programs. I assert that effective and economical solu-
tions must aim at the conduct of the lowest level decisionmakers and on 
the development of methods for modifying the behavior of those in the 
bureaucratic trenches who deal most directly with the public. Follow-
aimed at the administrative process is in fact aimed at the legal process in general. That is 
the reason the old wisdom that while Republicans do not regulate they do maintain the 
market through antitrust enforcement is no longer true. The reason the Reagan agenda 
is a more complete expression of the public mood than the Democratic agenda, that also 
supports deregulation, is that the former rejects the legal process as well as the adminis-
trative process as a tool for solving societal problems. ' 
"Most of these programs are dominated by what Friendly calls "mass justice" pro-
cesses. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). The APA covers 
the processes in only a few of these programs and administrative law (and constitutional 
law for that matter) has been particularly unsuccessful in its effort to improve perform-
ance here. 
14A good deal of subsequent literature has attempted to prove that the market will 
work despite the effects of high transportation cost. Nonetheless we should not ignore 
the possibility that in many cases administrative costs will be less than transaction costs. 
The laissez faire advocates seem to accept this conclusion in the "theory of the firm" 
literature arguing against government action to break up large corporations. 
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ing is a discussion of the regulatory problems from that perspective 
and a few possible techniques to improve performance at that level. 
THE BEST MODEL WILL FOCUS ON 
THE STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRATS 
Regulatory reforms since the enactment of the APA fail because they 
tend to concentrate on the same task the APA adequately performed 
some forty years ago. While important innovations have been made 
since the enactment of the APA, comprehensive structural and pro-
cedural reforms have not been able to demonstrate substantial poten-
tial for improving the performance. 15 The general structure provided 
by the APA has proven adequate. A fair conclusion as to the debate 
between Gellhorn and Davis over the value of generalization 16 may be 
that the AP A has been a useful generalization that has gone as far as 
structural and procedural generalization can go. 
Structure and procedure succeeds only to the extent that the im-
plementors can make it succeed and, hence, the administrative process 
is at the mercy of the lowest level officials. These officials have been 
called "implement.ing"17 or "street level"18 bureaucrats. They are the 
crucial link between the government and those it seeks to serve; for 
most they are the government. 
These implementing officials actually make the decisions that di-
rectly affect individual citizens; they represent the point at which the 
government program actually makes contact with its clients. The term 
includes decisionmakers such as police officers, schoolteachers, social 
workers, inspectors, prison officials, drug enforcement agents, and the 
like. 
Effective reform beyond the structure provided by the APA requires 
close attention to the implementing levels of the bureaucracy. Struc-
tural and procedural reforms are often irrelevant to street level per-
formance or in fact can aggravate the problems at that level. Thus 
administrative law must pay more attention to performance at this 
level; it must develop better understanding of the behavior of imple-
15McGarity, supra note 6, establishes four categories of reform: substantive, structural, 
procedural, and cognitive. Structural and procedural reforms seem the business of the 
narrow discipline of administrative law and substantive and cognitive reforms are the 
business of administrative law study in a broader sense than we usually use the term. C. 
KocH, supra note 4, at. 4. 
16Personal interview with Davis and Gellhorn. 
17]. MASHAW, supra note 3, at 16--17. 
18M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMA OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICE ( 1980). 
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menting officials and techniques for channeling and adjusting that 
behavior. Some effort has been made in this direction 19 but more is 
necessary. 
While stereotypes are particularly dangerous here, it is necessary to 
grasp some generalization about the attitudes of implementing 
bureaucrats and the atmosphere in which they work. Our understand-
ing of motivations and pressures will disclose why past efforts at 
structural and procedural reforms have done little to improve govern-
ment performance at this level, and it might suggest alternatives that 
may have more potential. 
Some negative characteristics of the bureaucracy at the street level 
are often aggravated by structural and procedural solutions aimed at 
the top of the process. Other negative characteristics of the im-
plementing level cannot be affected by such solutions. Thus in explor-
ing the potential negative aspects of the lower level bureaucracy, we 
can identify two categories: those characteristics in which structural 
and procedural requirements present some potential for doing more 
harm than good, and those for which structural and procedural re-
quirements tend to be irrelevant. 
The atmosphere at the lowest level is dominated by an inherent 
freedom of action or a "residual discretion."20 Implementing officials 
acquire a decisional power which is derived from the absence of any 
feasible way to monitor the bureaucratic decisions. Peter Schuck found 
that street level bureaucrats are "actually awash in discretion."21 He 
contends that this discretion mocks the formal decisionmaking struc-
ture: "Indeed, the lower their position in the agency hierarchy, the 
more de facto discretion they tend to enjoy."•• We know this to be true; 
few of us have not been in organizations in which some clerk had more 
real authority over us than our nominal bosses. 
A pervasive attitude which directly conflicts with this freedom of 
action is strong risk averseness. The usual exercise of this discretion 
generally leads not to affirmative abuse, but to a search for sanctuary 
from its risks. Bureaucrats retreat farther into these sanctuaries as the 
law and goals of the program are less clear. Uncertainty in communica-
19P. ScHUCK, SUING GovERNMENT: CiTIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONG (1983); J. 
MASHAW, supra note 3. 
201 have suggested that administrative law uses the term "discretion" in at least five 
different ways. Koch, judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
(1986). The term "residual discretion" here is meant to suggest the way the street level 
bureaucrats acquire all types of discretion where such discretion is not expressly dele-
gated. 
21 P. SCHUCK, supra note 19, at 66. 
22/d. at 66-67. 
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tion of authority and goals seems inevitable.23 Hence the implementing 
officials develop bastions built to avoid the risk inherent in the uncer-
tainty at the implementation stage. 
The stress between risk averseness and freedom of action, i.e., discre-
tion, causes many of the failures at the implementing levels. The 
official with such residual discretion generally retreats into formalism, 
inflexibility, and inaction. Ironically, procedural and structural re-
forms often aggravate these negative characteristics. 
Implementing officials protect themselves with draconian proce-
dures in order to demonstrate that the exercise of discretion was 
proper if not expressly authorized. 24 The stress between risk aversion 
and residual discretion cause an overcommitment to formalism be-
cause these conflicting pressures can be somewhat mitigated by a 
strategy of doing it the "right way." 
Formalism, however, is not the worst aspect of this stress for at least 
there is some movement. The most dysfunctional aspect of the stress is 
the escape to inflexibility. Wooden treatment of all cases, whether just 
or not, is substituted for sensitive exercise of the discretion.25 We have 
all known the frustration of the bureaucratic slogan: "If I do it for you I 
will have to do it for everyone." Although the existence of discretion 
demands a recognition of uniqueness, it is countermanded by an 
instinct for the sanctuary of inflexibility. Structural and procedural 
improvements tend to reinforce this type of bureaucratic behavior. 
Another sanctuary from uncertainty or hard cases is inaction. In-
deed, inaction is the m~or problem at the implementation stage.26 
Often inaction is the result of variables beyond the street level official's 
control, such as inadequate resources, but more often the inaction is 
the result of paralysis brought on by a special kind of fear. Structural 
and procedural requirements often increase the opportunities for 
resort to the protection of inaction.27 
In addition to these negative bureaucratic characteristics which 
structural and procedural corrections tend to aggravate are those for 
which such corrections are irrelevant. Structural and procedural re-
forms have little or no impact on the lack of personal commitment, 
absence of responsibility, and narrow vision. 
The lack of personal stake in the performance of the program 
23j. fREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT, 78-80; 93-94 (1978). 
24 P. ScHUCK, supra note 19, at 73-74. 
25See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM, 82-83 (1982). 
26P. ScHUCK, supra note 19, at 71-73. 
27See id. at 72. 
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creates both positive and negative opportunities for the system. Schuck 
suggests that the "zone of indifference" opens officials to positive 
inducement and allows the system to influence their conduct.28 How-
ever, insulation inherent in a public bureaucracy more likely removes 
some of the natural personal incentives that drive private bureauc-
racies. In short a government bureaucrat can more confidently trade 
safety for performance. 
Similarly, implementing officials can find numerous techniques tor 
deflecting responsibility. Being at the bottom, they can rationalize that 
breakdowns are due to the conduct of those higher up or to the 
"system" over which they have no control. 
Narrowness of vision is also a consistent complaint against the im-
plementing officials. The street level bureaucrat inhabits a small, often 
secluded, niche in an administrative program. Not only does this niche 
provide protection from responsibility but it narrows the official's view 
considerably. A m<tior failure at the street level is ignorance of the 
aspect of the program's mission the particular decision serves. The 
implementing officials lack a general picture of the total program and 
hence do not fashion their decisions with the overall administrative 
plan in mind.29 
Procedural and structural reforms have not dealt well with these 
behavioral elements. When we look at reform as a problem of motiva-
tion, we suspect that structural and procedural reforms have signifi-
cant potential for aggravating characteristics of formalism, inflexibil-
ity, and inaction, and are largely irrelevant to the improving personal 
commitment, responsibility, and narrow perspective. Thus we must 
look at other solutions to these problems. 
These solutions must be based on behavioral concepts and under-
standing of a very unique type of personnel management. Personnel 
management is difficult at best; it is particularly difficult to construct 
generalized models to work in the public bureaucracy. 
A special caution is necessary in this regard: Although we often refer 
to the government as if it were a monolith, the people who serve in it 
are diverse. 30 They vary in ability and attitudes, they relate to each 
other in a variety of ways, they relate to their organization and institu-
tions in general in different ways. They are individuals. Some are 
diligent and extremely able, some are average, and some are awful. 
The process must motivate the average or indolent and control the 
28/d. at 126. 
29See j. MASHAW, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 22 (1982). 
30P. SCHUCK, supra note 19, at xviii. 
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miscreants without unduly stifling the able and hardworking. Not an 
easy management task in the best of circumstances and the administra-
tive process is far from the best context to implement such solutions. 
Moreover, as Landis observed almost fifty years ago: "In the business 
of governing a nation ... we must take into account the fact that 
government will be operated by men of average talent and average 
ability and we must therefore devise our administrative processes with 
that in mind."31 We cannot propose a management approach built for 
paragons. 
Nonetheless, several techniques might contribute to motivating bet-
ter performance from these officials. First, we might use the legal 
process to improve the management of implementing officials. 
Second, we might consider guidance and cooperation as a tool for 
adjusting conduct and motivating performance. 
LEGAL PROCESS DEVICES FOR 
MANAGING THE BEHAVIOR OF 
STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRATS 
The law is experienced in controlling and modifying the behavior of 
diverse individuals. Thus we may be able to use the legal process to 
manage the behavior of street level bureaucrats. The key then is to find 
ways that the legal process can mold their behavior. 
Management through a comprehensive public tort system. Public tort liabil-
ity is one way the legal process can be used to manage the behavior of 
street level bureaucrats. While victim compensation and spreading the 
loss are important goals of a public tort system, they are secondary to 
the objective of controlling the activities of government officials and 
deterring misconduct. The public tort system is a form of communica-
tion from society to the officials. 32 
Until relatively recently, the doctrines of sovereign immunity and 
official immunity have combined to stifle the evolution of a public tort 
system.33 Even the Tort Claims Ace\ enacted about the time of the 
enactment of the APA, was too narrow to allow the development of a 
body of law aimed at government decisionmaking, even low level 
decisionmaking. 
The contraction of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, both by 
'T LANDIS, supra note 7, at 87. 
32 P. ScHUCK, supra note 19, at 123. 
33B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,§ 9.22, at 568-71 (1984). 
"Federal Torts Claims Act of 1946,28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982). 
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judicial invention and legislative waiver,35 has recently opened the way 
for the development of a comprehensive public tort system. Added to 
that, public officials, with some exceptions, are now under only a 
qualified, good faith immunity.36 Even the Tort Claims Act has been 
broadened to encompass a greater variety of government activitiesY 
The Bivens doctrine38 includes constitutional torts and Wood v. 
Strictland39 set the stage for damage actions based on due process 
violations.•" The amendments to federal question jurisdiction provide 
the jurisdictional base for the development of nonconstitutional public 
tort law. 41 
There is little now that stands in the way of a comprehensive public 
tort system. The task is to describe the objectives of that system. While 
compensation is important, the primary objective should be to deter 
misconduct and promote sound administrative decisions at the lowest 
level. 
Some have urged that a public tort system can best serve this objec-
tive by holding decisionmakers directly liable. They contend that un-
less officials themselves are held personally liable tort actions will have 
no real deterrent effect.<2 
Rather strong arguments, however, have been made that govern-
ment liability, not personal liability, will be more effective.'3 Peter 
Schuck argues very persuasively for this position.<• He does a very 
careful job of examining the pressures and motivations of street level 
bureaucrats. He also observes that the dominant characteristic is risk 
aversion. This risk aversion leads the bureaucrat to overcompensate 
for risk and hence to overrespond to the possibility of liability. The 
average street level bureaucrat's risk computation then will greatly 
overestimate probabilities that his conduct will be considered Im-
proper. This mistake will adversely skew the official's actions. 
"5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,§ 27:2, at 6--14 (2d ed. 1984). 
36/d. at§ 27:18, at 97-100. 
"See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency 
Administration of the Senate judiciary Comm., 97th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1982) (testimony of 
Donald J. Devine, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel); Bell, Proposed Amendment to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 HARV. J. oN LEGIS. I (1978). 
'"Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
39420 U.S. 308 (1975); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
40ACUS, Federal Officials Liability for Constitutional Violations (Rec. No. 82-6), I 
C.F.R. § 305.82-6. 
41 The APA expressly excludes damage actions. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
42While direct liability would be expected to increase the deterrent effect, it is conceded 
that it will lessen the chances for victim compensation. 
43Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110 (1981). 
44 P. ScHucK, supra note 19, at 99. 
438 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 
As previously stated, risk aversion and uncertainty in the exercise of 
residual discretion results in formalism, inflexibility, and inaction. 
Thus a public tort system that holds the official personally liable will 
have adverse consequences, particularly in the loss of individualizing 
and the retreat to inaction. 
Therefore, Schuck supports the notion that institutional, rather 
than personal, liability is preferable. He would incorporate the concept 
of respondeat superior into the public tort system.45 This means, not 
just that the government will be liable, but that the agency that employs 
the individual will be responsible. Indeed he would take the damages 
out of the agency's own budget. 46 
This strategy would motivate vigorous supervision and sound per-
sonnel practices. Davis, in Discretionary justice,47 found: 
Possibly the most important check of discretionary action is simply the 
normal supervision of subordinates by superiors .... Obviously, sufficient 
supervision can be a good protection against arbitrary exercise of discre-
tion.•• 
In the mass justice agencies particularly, affirmative action by superi-
ors is more likely to adjust the behavior of street level bureaucrats than 
court supervision through a personal liability system. 
Still, the danger in a public liability system, even one based on 
government respondeat superior, is the sanctuaries of formalism, in-
flexibility, and inaction. Not only bureaucrats, but bureaucracies, are 
extremely risk averse. Inevitably these sanctuaries provide protection 
and hence any increase in the probability of liability will increase the 
withdrawal into one or more of the sanctuaries. The jurisprudence that 
is created by this public tort system must face this major difficulty. 
Therefore, balance requires that if we create a comprehensive public 
tort system we must incorporate equal liability for acts of omission and 
commission. In this regard, perhaps this system could explore the 
experience of a group of private sector bureaucrats, corporate insid-
ers. Much of the liability imposed on them by securities regulations 
laws, particularly rule 1 Ob-Slitigation, centers on omission not commis-
sion. Perhaps some of this law can form the basis for public liability. 
Federal courts are already very knowledgeable and experienced in this 
body of law. 
45/d. at 82. 
46This would, of course, punish those who are to be served by the agency, but anyone 
who has been in government will know the impact of this on the managers of the agency. 
Imagine going to the relevant budget subcommittee with a line item for damage awards. 
47K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY jUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). 
18/d. at 143. 
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A respondeat superior doctrine then would be a threshold for the 
cr~ation of a public tort liability system. This system would focus on 
developing liability theories that promote the goals of the administra-
tive program and communicate to the street level bureaucrats the 
societal values they are to further. Once through the threshold we then 
must be prepared to develop a body of law with this purpose in mind. 
This body of law must be based on knowledge of the attitudes and 
motivations of the lower level officials; it cannot be abstract. 
Judicial review as management. While expansion of damage actions 
may increase courts' ability to affect the behavior of bureaucrats, the 
judicial review function also holds some promise. Judicial review, 
especially procedural review, has an effect on the management of 
agency personnel. Effective judicial review, like effective tort liability, 
requires judicial sensitivity to the prospective affect of judicial action 
on those who actually implement the ruling. 
There is a significant question as to whether judicial review can 
monitor the quality of individual administrative decisions, particularly 
in mass justice programs.49 But, judicial review, like institutional tort 
liability, can compel motivational techniques on the part of the agen-
cies. Mashaw observed: "This in no way suggests that [judicial review 
of] a well-designed quality assurance system is not an extraordinarily 
useful management tool for discovering apparent trouble spots, for 
providing continuous feedback to decisionmakers, and for promoting 
consistency across deciders."50 Therefore reviewing courts could have 
some impact on street level bureaucrats if they focused on the im-
plementing level of a program. 
Weaknesses of legal process management techniques. The legal process 
faces several difficulties in taking this management approach. Al-
though courts can contribute something to motivation of street level 
bureaucrats and can encourage agencies to pay closer attention to this 
aspect of their jobs, the nature of the legal process limits this contribu-
tion.51 
For one thing courts are not presented with the information neces-
sary to make such judgments. The records and arguments presented to 
courts do not contain information about the motivational effects of 
alternative judicial action. Judges are in a passive position. They have 
no investigative powers and they are not provided with the powers to 
obtain general information. 
49Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1295 (1975). 
50]. MASHAW, supra note 29, at 136. 
51/d. at 139-40. 
440 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 
Moreover, there is no evidence that judges would consider such 
evidence if it were presented. They see their function as confined to the 
solution of the case before them. They rarely get involved in analyzing 
the general behavior that brought about the individual controversy. 
Judges are in a reactive position; they are to do individual justice in the 
case before them. Their function is necessarily retrospective. 
At the other end, courts find it very difficult to communicate their 
judgments on such matters to the lower levels of the bureaucracy. They 
must, and naturally do, direct their pronouncements to the heads of 
the agency and there is a good deal of "slippage" between that com-
munication and the implementing stage.52 As Schuck observed: "Un-
fortunately, procedural innovations can no more eliminate these judi-
cial communications barriers than can the informational ones, and 
they may even make matters worse."53 
There is another significant problem with judges involving them-
selves in the management of lower level government employees. As 
Schuck observed, judges have a strong class bias. 54 Whether they are 
born to it or rise to it, they are representatives of a higher class and 
defenders of the judgment of their class. They have little empathy for 
the situation of the lower level bureaucrat or sensitivity to the exchange 
between those officials and their clients. 
Nor do they have expertise in managing implementation of bureau-
cracies. The curious fact is that federal judges rarely have administra-
tive experience.55 Trial experience is generally considered a pre-
requisite to appointment to the trial bench because it is the relevant 
experience. Yet federal judges, especially appellate court judges, 
spend a vast amount of their time dealing with administrative pro-
grams and there is no effort to assure they have experience in the 
trenches with the administrative process. 
Thus while a judiciary sensitive to the management aspects of their 
job could make a valuable contribution through a public liability system 
and judicial review, they face substantial difficulties in an effort to do 
so. For this reason, a system of managing street level bureaucrats 
cannot be based totally on judicial actions. 
52P. ScHUCK, supra note 19, at 5. 
"Id. at 163. 
54/d. at 158. 
55Jd. 
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A SYSTEM OF POSITIVE MOTIVATION 
THROUGH GUIDANCE 
In addition to the above defects in the legal process as a management 
tool is the fact that it can create only negative incentives. The black 
letter law of personnel theory dictates that positive incentives, particu-
larly for educated and upper level personnel, are much more effective 
than negative incentives. 
Of course a little creativity could employ the judiciary in a system of 
positive motivations for street level bureaucrats. Indeed that is what 
Schuck had in mind with a respondeat superior based public tort 
system; the liability system would motivate the agency managers to 
fashion programs to motivate proper lower level performance. 56 Cer-
tainly judicial review also could be structured so that it would have 
much the same objective. However, the indirect impact of the judicial 
action, even in these systems, diminishes effectiveness considerably. 
An advisory code of professional conduct for government officials. The task 
for regulatory reform then is to find a more positive and supportive 
approach to motivating good conduct on the part of street level 
bureaucrats. One approach that seems natural for administrative law is 
advisory rulemaking: a code of professionalism for low level govern-
ment decisionmakers. 
Government lawyers receive some guidance as to ethical conduct.57 
The ABA's new model rules make a better effort at recognizing the 
special problems of government attorneys. 58 If one were to choose a 
limited number of rules and related comments, the model rules can be 
said to have chosen the best ones.59 A broader effort to deal with 
government attorneys is the Federal Bar Association's rules.60 Both of 
these, however, cover only government lawyers, acting as lawyers, and 
hence cannot serve in the capacity suggested here. 
One effort encompassing all government employees began with the 
Ethics in Government Act. 61 From this has arisen the Office of Govern-
56Schuck would add "management rules" promulgated by the relevant agency to the 
public liability system. /d., at 143-45. 
57C. KocH, supra note 4, § 1.13, at 30-35. 
58 ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association on August 2, 1983. 
59Rules 1.11 and 1.12; Comments to Rules 1.6; 1.10; 1.13; 3.9; 5.1; and 8.2. 
60FBA, Canons of Professional Ethics ( 1972); see Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer 
and Professional Ethics, 60 ABA J. 1541 (1974). 
61 Ethics in Government Act, 92 Stat. 1824 ( 1978). 
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ment Ethics.62 This agency is in the process of generating broader and 
broader rules relating to ethical conduct by government employees. 
While these are all necessary steps to improving the integrity of 
government, they do not offer the positive guidance necessary to 
promote better low level government decisionmaking. Thus my pro-
posal will not be aimed at ethical conduct but at guiding sound govern-
ment decisionmaking. It will not be limited to lawyers but will include a 
larger group: professional implementing officials. 
The goals of a code of official professionalism. A code of professionalism 
for government decisionmakers would offer a whole new technique 
for bringing about regulatory reform. And it would aim the reform 
where it will have the most effect: the implementing decisionmakers. It 
would improve government decisionmaking in several ways. 
First, a code of professionalism for government decisionmakers 
would begin the long overdue study and discussion of techniques for 
guidance of lower level decisionmakers. The process of creating the 
code itself will further this goal. 
The process of drafting the code will force many individuals and 
groups to focus on the problems of the frontline actors in the adminis-
trative process. It would be particularly useful for groups such as the 
Administrative Law Section of the ABA and the Administrative Con-
ference to undertake this study. 
Developing the code should bring together as many approaches and 
disciplines as possible. Administrative law, for example, has not made 
very good use of the growing body of relevant behavioral research.63 
While we sometimes refer to social science materials, we rarely incorpo-
rate them into decisions about how the process should work. 
The code will further the discussion and education within the "pro-
fession." After promulgation, the code would provide a forum where-
62 The Ethics in Government Act ... established the Office of Government Ethics 
in the Office of Personnel Management to provide overall direction of executive 
branch policies related to preventing conflicts of interest on the part of officers and 
employees of any executive agency. 
The Office develops, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Office of 
Personnel Mana1;ement, rules and regulations to be promulgated by the President 
or the Director of the Office of Government Ethics pertaining to the identification 
and resolution of conflicts of interest; 
Monitors and investigates compliance with public financial disclosure require-
ments of title II of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ... ; 
Orders corrective action on the part of agencies and employees which the 
Director of the Office of Government Ethics deems necessary; and 
Provides information on and promotes understanding of ethical standards in 
executive agencies. 
The U.S. Government Manual 1985-86, at 60 I. 
63$. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 9-10 (1982). 
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by seminars and workshops wou-ld be developed to discuss compliance 
and perhaps delve more deeply into proper decisionmaking. These 
workshops would add detail by examining the code in the context of 
specific problems. At the least, it will institutionalize a communication 
process whereby lower level decisionmakers would exchange informa-
tion among themselves and those outside government. 
The code will also create an atmosphere of professionalism among 
government officials. The aim will be for cooperative attitude by gov-
ernment officials to further the goals of the code. The law, as a be-
havioral discipline, tends to undervalue the impact of cooperative 
conduct and social expectations. Potential individual deviations from 
professional codes, like those in the legal profession, should not cloud 
the fact that most professionals will voluntarily comply with profes-
sional standards of conduct. Lower level government officials will act in 
the same manner as most other professionals and, if presented with a 
realistic code of professional standards, will try to comply. Even if the 
enforcement of the code is sketchy, voluntary compliance will make it 
generally effective.64 
Indeed the code will have the special benefits of creating a new class 
of professionals who will acquire the pride of professionals in their 
work.65 Defining government officialdom in professional terms will 
improve the self-image of street level bureaucrats. It is often suggested 
that high regard of continental bureaucrats improves the performance 
of European bureaucracies.66 A similar attitude would improve the 
performance of American bureaucrats. 
Yet, where formal enforcement is undertaken, the code will serve as 
a basis for the enforcement actions. The code will provide concreteness 
upon which lawsuits can be based. And even if formal enforcement is 
sketchy, the risk averseness of most government officials will give any 
enforcement of the standards added formal impact. 
On the other hand, an advisory code will increase the fairness of 
enforcement actions. Tort liability, either against the individual of-
ficials or the agency, is rarely preceded by adequate notice as to proper 
conduct. Besides some high sounding rhetoric, sanctions against indi-
vidual officials at this point are based on post hoc standards.67 A code 
would fill in the detail and bureaucrats can be held to more clearly 
articulated decisional standards. 
The professional codes can provide protection for those who con-
64P. SCHUCK, supra note 19, at 68 (describing a "duty threshold"). 
65J. MASHAW, supra note 3, at 26 ("The goal of the Professional is to serve the client."). 
66E.g., L. BROWN & j. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 15-17 (2d. ed. 1973). 
67P. ScHUCK, supra note 19, at 94. 
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duct themselves properly. As lawyers use professional standards to 
deflect pressures from their clients, so street level bureaucrats could 
use this code for protection from similar pressures from their "clients." 
A code of professionalism for government decisionmakers will give 
officials a safe harbor from citizen and special interest pressures.68 
Interestingly, one of Schuck's examples of the pressures faced by 
frontline bureaucratic decisionmakers is deadline pressure on NASA's 
frontline employees.69 A code provision that established a professional 
duty that enabled theN ASA decisionmakers to resist outside pressures 
might have saved lives and, ironically, performed a great service to the 
agency. 
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CONTENT OF THE CODE 
This piece is, if anything, a preliminary inquiry. My hope is to 
generate thought, study, and comment about a guidance approach to 
improving the performance of some administrative decisionmaking 
processes. Therefore, I am not prepared to offer a fully developed 
advisory code of professional conduct for government officials. 
However, I might suggest some ideas as to what the code might deal 
with and how it might be constructed to further goals that have not 
been furthered by structural reforms. 
Dominant is the observation that structural and procedural ap-
proaches have not been successful in furthering several basic values 
inherent in government decisional process, particularly in the context 
of "mass justice" programs. These programs necessarily confer a sub-
stantial amount of individualizing discretion on street level bureau-
crats.70 Efforts to structure and confine this discretion inevitably reach 
the point of diminishing marginal utility: the more this is done the 
more the system loses its ability to do individual justice. As suggested 
above, such solutions tend to aggravate the negative characteristics of 
implementing bureaucracies, such as formalism, inflexibility, and inac-
tion. 
The structural and procedural requirements at the implementing 
stage, are not in fact, well defined. The APA does not cover most of 
these processes because it has no provision for informal adjudication. 
Most of the structure and procedure, therefore, is derived from the 
due process clause of the Constitution. 
68/d. at 67-68. 
69/d. at 77. 
70/d. at xvii. 
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The law here is in disarray. 71 It is firmly established that there is a 
two-tier analysis. 72 The first tier of analysis determines whether due 
process is required because the government is attempting to deprive an 
individual oflife, liberty, or property. Great progress has been made in 
redefi_ning property and liberty interests. Once it is determined that a 
property or liberty interest is involved, the second tier of analysis 
determines what process is due. Despite some extremely thoughtful 
commentary, however, the law as to this question has not even estab-
lished a method of analysis. I submit the reason is that generalized 
procedural prescriptions cannot alone attain the goals identified for 
these informal decisionmaking systems. Perhaps a code of conduct for 
those making frontline decisions in these programs would assist in 
furthering these goals. 
There have been some searching inquiries into the values to be 
served by mass justice procedures. 73 Several of these values are not 
susceptible to structural or procedural implementation but may form 
the basis for developing guidance and cooperative conduct by im-
plementing officials. 
Both Mashaw and Verkuil identify a value of dignity or satisfaction. 74 
Indeed Mashaw has lumped the current approach to due process into 
what he terms the "dignity mode."75 It seems unlikely that procedures 
can be designed to further satisfaction or dignity, but the officials may 
conduct themselves in ways that will further these goals. The dignity/ 
satisfaction type values suggest some possible code provisions. 
The code could admonish the street level bureaucrat, to create an air 
of caring and sensitivity as well as impartiality. Mashaw observes that 
people really can distinguish between losing and being treated well. 76 
At the street level, the attitude of the bureaucrat is the most important 
factor in this judgement. 
The street level bureaucrat has a good deal of individualizing 
discretion. 77 The code could advise on how to use that discretion. The 
71 See generally J. MASHAW, supra note 29. 
72C. KocH, supra note 4, § 7.21, at 563. 
73Verkuil, supra note 4; Mashaw, supra note 4; Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: 
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. Ill (1978); 
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DuE PROCESS, 
NoMos XVIII, at 126 0· Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1977); Thibault & Walker, The 
Relationship Between Procedural and Distributive justice, 65 VA. L. REv. 1401 (1979). 
74Verkuil, supra note 4, at 753 (A just process is "one where the locus of control remains 
in the parties."). 
75]. MASHAW, supra note 29, at 162. 
16/d. at 163. 
77 Koch, supra note 20. 
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bureaucrat should know the limits of his discretion and strive to use it 
wisely and flexibly without undue formalism. On the other hand the 
bureaucrat should assure that the applicant understands the limits of 
his power and any additional rights that the applicant may have. 
Consistency is another major contributor to furthering the dignity/ 
satisfaction values. A study of the Social Security Administration hear-
ing process observed: 
While there is no adequate means for determining how much it is worth to 
achieve consistent results, the demoralization costs (alienation, distrust, loss 
of faith in government) associated with current widespread belief that 
disability decisions are arbitrary, are likely to be quite high." 
Yet, as one commentator on human behavior observed: "A foolish 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen 
and philosophers and divines."79 The operative word in this truth is 
"foolish." Individualizing discretion is the administrative law cure for 
foolish consistency.80 With that protection, an administrative program 
could safely strive for consistency. 
Consistency in any program that requires a number of decisions, the 
mass justice programs, is extremely difficult. 8 ' Rulemaking can im-
prove the chances for beneficial consistency but it can only go so far. 
Generalized procedures to further consistency are more likely to push 
the individual decisions into the "foolish" category. 
The virtues of sound consistency may be more readily attainable 
through a commitment by implementing officials. Surely they can 
strive to be consistent in their own decisions where the circumstances 
permit. And they can strive to be consistent within their office or 
region. They can seek ways to obtain consistency throughout the 
program. Communication with other officials and attendance at con-
ferences, for example, can help improve consistency throughout the 
program. They can be admonished to broaden their knowledge of the 
programs and incorporate a broader perspective into their individual 
decisions. Some beneficial consistency can be added to the programs 
without resort to wooden decisionmaking. 
As noted, inaction is a constant complaint against the street level 
bureaucrat. Inaction adds substantially to the dissatisfaction with these 
78MASHAW et al., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, 19-20 (1978). 
79Emerson, Self-Reliance, THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF QuoTATIONS, 200:40 (2d. ed. 
1955). 
80Perhaps the most positive sense of the term discretion is the power to make indi-
vidualizing adjustments. Koch, supra note 20. 
81 Mashaw, supra note 4, at 44-45. 
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processes. Judicial review and management rules have been ineffective 
in assuring timeliness.82 However a standard of conduct may have some 
effect on creating a drive for timeliness. 
Other code provisions could deal with even more emotional aspects 
of the dignity/satisfaction values. For example, the code could provide 
direction on how to speak to applicants. Sexual or racial reference, for 
example, could be made improper professional conduct. Demeaning 
references could be avoided. More subtle and detailed information 
about the emotional aspects of such proceedings from the applicants' 
point of view could be incorporated in the code. 
Dignity/satisfaction values are bound up in expectation and people's 
expectations are schooled by a longstanding sense of appropriateness. 
Thus those values lead to another i<;lentified value: tradition. 
Tradition and related issues should affect due process. 83 Indeed 
Mashaw has described a major group of due process cases and com-
mentary as fitting under the "appropriateness model."84 The code 
could command the implementing official to provide procedures that 
society would ordinarily consider appropriate. But it could do more 
than that; it could assure that these "appropriate" or traditional proce-
dures are not reduced to mere formalities. 
For example, the code could reaffirm the need for real and under-
standable notice. It could admonish the implementing official to assure 
that the opportunity to participate is not clouded by confusing formal-
ity. It is clear that those caught in administrative processes often find 
them incomprehensible. The bureaucrat can, in the context of the 
traditional formalities, assure that the applicant actually feels part of 
the process that resulted in the decision. 
Another traditional procedural requirement can be used to further 
the values of due process: reason.85 The reason requirement in the 
hands of a sensitive bureaucrat can do more than satisfy the formal due 
process requirements. A sensitive official will assure that the reasons 
are in fact understandable to the applicant, that the applicant knows 
why the action was taken. A professional implementing official will 
assure that the "client" is satisfied that a sound, if disappointing, 
"'See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 3, at 42-43. 
"'Mashaw, supra note 4, at 54. 
8
']. MASHAW, supra note 29, at 48 ("The model of appropriateness begins with tradi-
tion .... ). · 
"'Rabin, job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a 
Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 79 ( 1976) ("[I]t is essential that we retain the 
core safeguard against arbitrariness, the right to receive a meaningful explanation of 
what is being done to the individual.") 
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decision was made. The code could charge the bureaucrat with a duty 
to assure that the reasons for the decision are actually communicated to 
the applicant. 
One of the most complex values served by the administrative process 
is correctness.86 Accuracy in this context is so hard to measure and 
achieve that we often retreat into an unrealistic trust of procedural 
guarantees. Yet there is no evidence that any of the adversarial ele-
ments actually adds to the accuracy. Nor do the clients of the adminis-
trative process confuse procedural correctness with actual correctness. 
The code could create a duty to do what is reasonable with the 
resources available to make accurate decisions. Professionalism, it 
could note, often means doing more than is formally required. A code 
could be of considerable help in guaranteeing a satisfactory search for 
accuracy and some help in achieving it. 
In short, structural and procedural solutions can only go so far in 
furthering some of the guiding values of the administrative process. 
These values, however, could be enhanced by guidelines to those 
actually making the decisions and in this way several of these values 
would have a better chance for fulfillment. These values could be 
pursued with less risk of aggravating the negative bureaucratic charac-
teristics. 
CONCLUSION 
Already there is considerable popular dissatisfaction with loosening 
of control of business. The combined force of the retreat from dereg-
ulation and the continued demands on agencies to solve other social 
problems will raise again the demand for improvements in the admin-
istrative process. If a new era in the evolution of government involve-
ment is emerging, then a renewed demand will be made on administra-
tive law to find ways to deliver the services, including decisionmaking 
services, expected of modern government. I suggest here that new 
approaches to answer this demand must be explored and one new 
avenue will seek techniques for motivating implementing or street level 
bureaucrats. 
As Smythe suggests in her piece in this issue, the reigning view today 
is that we began delving into the mysteries of the evil device of the 
administrative process in 1887 with the creation of the ICC. 87 Like the 
ICC, however, the Harvard Law Review began in 1887. It would be 
86MASHAW et al., supra note 78, at 13-19. 
87Smythe, An Irreverent Look at Regulatory Reform, 38 Ao. L. REv. 451 (1986). 
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more apt to blame it, not the ICC, for starting the processes at which 
modern deregulation is aimed, for that journal represents the begin-
ning of a massive and lasting commitment by lawyers to make the legal 
process responsive to the problems of modern society. One of the 
concepts that has been part of that search is the administrative process. 
At least at the time of the creation of the administrative process, this 
concept was seen as a vehicle for a positive contribution by the legal 
process; one of the several ways the legal process can be employed to 
correct the abuses that one segment of society could, without govern-
ment intervention, impose on other segments of society. 
The task then is for administrative law, and the groups that contrib-
ute to its development, such as the ABA's Section of Administrative 
Law, to respond to the current dissatisfaction. One idea, suggested in 
this piece, is an advisory code of professionalism for government 
decisionmakers, with special attention to those decisionmakers that 
labor in the trenches of the administrative process. The strategy of 
such a code is that clearer standards and the motivation of professional 
pride will result in voluntary behavior that will improve some aspects of 
implementing decisions. The consequence may be more trust of the 
administrative process to further many of the goals of society. 
